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‘The end of apartheid should have been a
fucking bloodbath by any metric in human
history and it wasn’t. The only reason it
wasn’t was because Desmond Tutu and
Mandela and all these guys figured out that
if a system is corrupt, then the people who
adhere to that system and are incentivized
by that system are not criminals. They are
victims.’
- Dave Chappelle, The Bird Revelation
If by ‘social justice’ we mean whatever is happening with the cancel culture
movement—or whatever you want to call it—in academic philosophy, then I
am wholly against that form of social justice. Whether there is another kind
of social justice worth pursuing, I will bracket in this paper (although my
view should be clear to the attentive and charitable reader). For now, my aim
is to critique a particular trend of behavior that we see manifesting in the
philosophy blogosphere and in philosophy departments. We are all well-aware
of what I am talking about, and my aim here is not to rehearse any examples.
The project is not to shame any particular parties involved. But for clarity,
this is the kind of behavior I have in mind: x philosopher raises a critique of
feminism or any other view in the social justice movement and x is called a
Nazi, a fascist, a homophobe, or sometimes even a racist. Consequently, there
are often calls to boycott or fire x philosopher; have their paper retracted
from a journal; and unfortunately, such philosophers often receive threats of
violence. Call this the Cancel Response. By now, anyone reading this—
whether they are a philosophy professor, philosophy graduate student or
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undergraduate student, or not—knows exactly what I am talking about. The
Cancel Response is rampant throughout academic culture—philosophy in
particular—and in our broader society. (Going forward, I will use the term
‘social justice’ to refer to this kind of behavior).
I will assume that everyone involved in the so-called ‘social justice move-
ment’ has pure and sincere intentions. They recognize that there are indeed
injustices in the world, and they are trying to figure out how to get rid of
them as swiftly and e ciently as possible. Some members of this movement
might even have have pernicious intentions. But that’s besides the point.
The argument I will give against the Cancel Response will apply to those
with the best of intentions, and thus a fortiori to those with the worst of
intentions as well. My thesis is this: members of the social justice movement
should not directly seek to enact social justice; rather, they should seek social
mercy.
Why is that the case? Justice—and here I appeal to any pre-theoretical
or theoretical intuitions you may have about this moral concept—is simply,
in most cases, not achievable in this world. While it is (of course) a desirable
trait of any society, it simply can never be attained (at least when we directly
seek it out). On the one hand, it is not clear whether vigilante social justice
(which is often the kind of justice that is enacted online by social justice
warriors) is even just at all. Moreover, it is not clear whether any legal sys-
tem will ever provide complete justice to any victims or parties a↵ected by
wrongful acts. How often do we hear that the family of a murdered victim
still does not feel that justice was served even when the murderer is con-
victed, thrown in prison, and even executed? Thus, if one seeks full justice
for a wrong, one is simply misguided and has false assumptions about how
things will ultimately pan out—in terms of both addressing the wrong, and
acquiring any form of healing and closure one may seek.
That is not to say that justice for all kinds of wrongdoings—in a court
of law—should not be sought out. But that is not the kind of wrongdoings
I am talking about. I do not have in mind murder, rape, pedophilia and so
forth. I have in mind cases where a professor, a laymen or whoever speaks
out about an issue in the social justice movement, and is then attacked to
a degree that their livelihood and even sometimes safety is put on the line.
I have in mind, in short, alleged injustices that occur in discussions of the
nature and relations between the oppressor and the oppressed.
At this point, someone might want to stop me and press a point that we
hear too often: although verbal disagreements about the nature of oppression
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do not, in most cases, constitute or immediately terminate in real physical
harms (as they are often expressed on blogs or twitter), they are still harmful.
I am not going to contest that at all. I agree that, in some cases at least,
certain kinds of speech (although technically free and protected in the current
legal system) can be intrinsically harmful, and can be conducive to harm
by encouraging certain kinds of oppressive behavior. But even with that
in place, the Cancel Response is not morally appropriate. To anticipate
an implication of the argument I am about to give, if the Palestinian and
the Israeli who have both lost members of their family can sit down and
have merciful conversations with each other and forgive each other, and if
Odin Lloyd’s mother can forgive Aaron Herndandez and his family for the
murder of her son, then certainly the radical feminist and the gender-critical
feminist can sit down and talk to each other over a set of tweets in a scholarly,
productive, and gentle way.
It is embarrassing that laymen who perhaps have never read the great
moral philosophers that we have, can exhibit higher moral character than the
so-called intellectuals. But perhaps this just confirms Iris Murdoch’s point
all along: the peasant is often way more virtuous than the philosopher. A
further point: if the radical feminist who receives criticism thinks that their
interlocutor is a Nazi—that is an a↵ront to what happened in the Holocaust.
And more importantly, I think there is a pernicious kind of privilege there.
To even criticize a white radical feminist is perceived by them as if you’re
killing them. But that is childish behavior that needs to be corrected. Sure,
it hurts and is harmful. But let me take you back to childhood: remember the
kids in elementary school or even preschool that you may perhaps (unjustly)
have pushed, punched, or kicked in the playground, and they would run to
the teacher and say that you “broke their arm,” or “you tried to kill them”?
To me, it seems like the same thing is happening here. I’m not denying that
a certain kind of (psychological) harm obtains in these situations (and can
lead to physical harm), but we need to be measured in our descriptions and
evaluations of what actually happened.
My suspicion is this: the actual oppressed people that these social justice
warriors are talking about would have more tolerance for the kind of speech
in question than the philosophers that decided to speak for them, who find
such clearly “o↵ensive”. Indeed, just watch the epilogue to Chappelle’s re-
cent special, Sticks and Stones for evidence of this in his interactions with
a trans-woman at the Punchline Comedy Club in San Francisco. A lot of
these philosophers have never experienced real harm. Many of them (Ivy
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Leaguers and what-not), I suspect, have probably never undergone the very
important transformative experience of getting physically checked : whether
that is being punched in the face, mugged, body checked in a sports match,
and so forth (sidebar: first rule of fight club, is that you do not talk about
fight club). They don’t have any sense of what real harm looks like. And I
don’t doubt that the LGBTQ community, refugees, black people, Muslims,
Jews, Hispanic people, and so forth do know what real harm is like. They
have experienced it, they experience it arguably every day of their lives. And
that’s why they often pick and choose their battles. They are not going to
flip out over a little tweet or even a published paper, when there are real
threats at hand.
Again, I want to stay on track and not get into the business of dis-
cussing specific examples in philosophy, as I aim to provide a general argu-
ment (which, of course, should at some point be expanded to discuss specific
examples in recent history). The argument runs as follows.
1. Suppose philosopher x says something that, to the lights of philosopher
y is racist, homophobic, transphobic, etc.
2. Suppose further that—albeit unknowingly—philosopher x is objectively
wrong, that is, philosopher y is right about philosopher x ’s views.
3. Call the conjunction of (1) and (2) Problematic Case.
4. If and when Problematic Case obtains, the Cancel Response is
still—at least in most cases—morally deficient as a first response, and
arguably a final response.
) the Cancel Response is still—at least in most cases—morally defi-
cient as a first response, and arguably a final response.
Premise (4) is in need of defense. This will require arguing against the con-
sequent of premise (4). I will do this indirectly: I will argue that the proper
response to Problematic Case is not the Cancel Response of the so-
cial justice movement, but rather the Mercy Response of what I hope will
become the Social Mercy movement.1
1In what follows, I will primarily argue that those in the social justice movement need
to issue the Mercy Response instead of the Cancel Response, but my considered
view is that all parties involved need to issue the Mercy Response to Problematic
Case—even the philosopher outside of the social justice movement that is the patient of
the Cancel Response.
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What, then, is Social Mercy? Here, we need to start with an analysis
of what ‘mercy’ amounts to. ‘Mercy’ is distinct from both justice and kind-
ness in that mercy can only obtain when a party who is harmed or wronged
acts, out of good will, toward the wrongdoer with kindness, love, respect,
attention, guidance, and ultimately some kind of forgiveness (while not for-
getting the wrong). Mercy does not mean turning a blind eye. The merciful
victim will often recognize a wrong as such, and communicate that to the
perpetrator. However, a condition on their mercy is not that the perpetrator
even recognize that they did something wrong, even if they know that they
might be in ‘trouble’. Rather, the merciful victim acts mercifully because
they recognize that they are in a position of power. And a good position of
power at that. They are in a better position to actually a↵ect change in the
moral condition of the perpetrator through their mercy, rather than through
seeking social justice.
The last point requires unpacking, for in that unpacking lies an answer to
a question that might have popped into the mind of the reader: why should
I be merciful when I can be just? Why is mercy even a desirable moral trait?
There are a variety of answers that one could give specific to almost every
normative ethical theory. However, I will give one that is relevant to the case
at hand, namely, the behavior of the social justice movement. I suspect that
moral philosophers can figure out on their own how to modulate the Mercy
Response, and place it within their preferred normative moral system.
The reality is—and I really won’t defend this here as I really take it to be
obvious in the same way that radical feminists often take their positions to be
obvious—is that seeking social justice, in the way that academic philosophers
in the social justice movement are seeking it, inevitably creates more ene-
mies than allies. By shaming someone, calling for their work to be boycotted,
starting petitions for them to be fired from tenured or untenured positions,
and issuing threats of violence, in no way shape or form will help the alleged
perpetrator of the Problematic Case amend what is wrong in their views
and speech (at least in a free, non-coercive way). However, in moments of
anger and in moments of wrong-doing, issuing mercy to an alleged perpetra-
tor actually creates a space for a free, healthy, and fruitful conversation and
change. I am not saying that the merciful person must turn the other cheek
to get hit again in a Christian manner. But disparaging remarks, hateful
emails, and threats against someone’s livelihood and body is never a good
means for real social progress.
But there are several deeper points here that I want to make. The first
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is epistemological, the second is moral, the third is political, the fourth is
practical, and the fifth is moral again.
On the epistemological point. We never truly know why someone says
what they say, especially when those statements are expressed online. Often
times, the same statements, when expressed in a real conversation and with
context, might not upset anyone. People are much less apt to morally judge
someone when they see that person as a real person in front of them (not
as a set of twitter fingers on the other side of an online conversation). As
such, we need to have a certain degree of skepticism and humility before we
rush to judge the intentions of someone else. And indeed—even in allegedly
problematic views that are fully articulated in a published article—do not
serve as complete grounds to morally damn the author. Much more is needed.
For example, someone could have written something in a bad state of mental
health—perhaps they are manic or depressed. Maybe they were passively
indoctrinated—indeed, that is possible even for philosophers. Or maybe, they
just simply misspoke, even if it was out of anger. Finally, it is not even
clear whether statements written down online are even a good indicator of
someone’s beliefs. Moving from an observation of someone’s statements, to
a claim about their beliefs, to then a claim about their intentions and moral
character is a very substantive move. And the degree of evidence should
be high, and a methodology for issuing such judgments and one’s moral
understanding of why one is allowed to make such inferences needs to be
clear. Nothing is obvious in this matter.
On the moral point. Picking up on the last issue, we need to take moral
luck seriously. While we want to take pride in being rational agents that
fully form our own beliefs, the reality is much more complicated. Much of
our beliefs—whether they turn out to be “socially just” or not—are in a
very real way a matter of luck. Someone who grew up in a diverse environ-
ment may already be inclined toward an inclusive attitude to minorities. But
someone who grew up in a monolithic white environment might not. We need
to have some humility and attenuate any self-righteousness before we attack
others. Taking credit for just happening to grow up in a diverse and toler-
ant environment does not really mean that one would have had such views
would things have been slightly di↵erent. Conversely, being blamed or even
excommunicated from the moral community for passively accruing racist or
homophobic beliefs (and even expressing them) is not quite right when such
a person would not have adopted those views would things have been other-
wise, and if things were to turn out otherwise through e↵ective (i.e. merciful)
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communication.
On the political point. In terms of strategy, being socially just with others
is just a bad move. Although social justice may create allies, if I were to put
my cards on the table being merciful is much more e↵ective. The reason is
that the just person cannot induce loyalty in others in the way that the kind—
and more importantly—the merciful person can. This is really an empirical
point. Just think on moments in your life or in the lives of others you may
know where you or someone else may have been kind or merciful to someone
who caused some harm. I would bet good money that, if that mercy was
enacted in the right kind of way, the perpetrator would have modulated
their behavior, and perhaps become loyal to you in some respect. This is a
point about how power dynamics can be shifted in systems of oppression. In
order for real social justice to obtain, the oppressors must somehow become
loyal to the oppressed. The oppressed really cannot change the system on
their own—at some point, the oppressors need to join in, and become loyal
agents of change in undoing systems of oppression.
On the practical point. As I hinted at earlier, social justice is not something
that is attainable. However, mercy is something that is instantly attainable
once the moral agent that is the victim decides to do it. You don’t need
a court of law to decide how to be merciful. You get to decide how to do
it and whether to do it yourself. Mercy is attainable in this cruel world.
Real justice, in any form, simply is not attainable (at least completely). If
we all just acted a little bit more merciful with each other, I’m sure the
conversations in academic philosophy would surely shift for the better.
A final moral point. What is the logical end of the Cancel Response?
The reality is this: just about everyone, on the logic of the social justice
movement, should be canceled. We all have skeletons in our closet. And
I’m always suspicious of those allegedly brave philosophers who are at the
frontline in starting petitions and calling other philosophers out. As it usually
turns out, these people manifest such retaliatory behavior because there is
probably something about themselves that just does not sit well with them.
Maybe they did something that was not socially just in the past, and now
they’re trying to amend it. Or maybe their white guilt has overwhelmed them
to the point that they don’t know how to channel it. But that’s besides the
point. Nobody should really desire justice, because if we desire justice, then
everyone needs to reveal what they did to uphold systems of oppression. And
the reality is that we are all–either actively or passively–oppressive agents.
Taking the social justice logic to its end, everyone would have to be canceled.
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But that’s simply not right. Surely the x philosopher who writes a critical
analysis of gender, also produces a lot of good in their university, community,
and for their families. We must not forget that many of these philosophers,
on both sides, have family—partners and children. When someone calls for x
philosopher to be fired, you are a↵ecting the entire trajectory of a child’s life.
Again, I am not saying that there are not cases where a philosopher should
be fired. Of course there is. But the Cancel Response should not be our
go-to move, even in very problematic cases. For it is cruel, and cruelty does
not generate goodness. Rather, our first response should be mercy.
Indeed, I think that this is the exact kind of thing that Dave Chappelle
is up to in his statement in the Bird Revelation and many of his recent
Netflix specials, and I commend him for his bravery in speaking out on these
issues. Oftentimes, the best philosophers amongst us are not professors at all.
They are found as homeless bums on the street, comedians, rappers, grocery
baggers, Uber drivers, college freshmen, and children. Philosophy professors
need to wake up. Even if they don’t realize it, their behavior is embarrassing
and is making academic philosophy look like a joke. And I hate to say it, but
if this is the end of all of our graduate degrees, theorizing, and publishing,
then it kind of is. May the truly just and merciful philosophers please stand
up. And in the words of the late great Tupac Shakur (may he rest in peace):
“only God can judge me.”
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